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REVIEW
Surveillance for highly pathogenic avian influenza in wild birds
in the USA
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LUTMAN,1 Brandon B. SCHMIT,1 John A. BAROCH,1 Dennis J. KOHLER1 and Alan FRANKLIN2
1United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Wildlife Services, National Wildlife Disease
Program, Fort Collins, USA and 2United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Wildlife
Services, National Wildlife Research Center, Fort Collins, Colorado, USA
Abstract
As part of the USA’s National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, an Interagency Strategic Plan for the Early
Detection of Highly Pathogenic H5N1 Avian Influenza in Wild Migratory Birds was developed and implemented.
From 1 April 2006 through 31 March 2009, 261 946 samples from wild birds and 101 457 wild bird fecal samples were
collected in the USA; no highly pathogenic avian influenza was detected. The United States Department of
Agriculture, and state and tribal cooperators accounted for 213 115 (81%) of the wild bird samples collected; 31,
27, 21 and 21% of the samples were collected from the Atlantic, Pacific, Central and Mississippi flyways, respectively.
More than 250 species of wild birds in all 50 states were sampled. The majority of wild birds (86%) were dabbling
ducks, geese, swans and shorebirds. The apparent prevalence of low pathogenic avian influenza viruses during
biological years 2007 and 2008 was 9.7 and 11.0%, respectively. The apparent prevalence of H5 and H7 subtypes
across all species sampled were 0.5 and 0.06%, respectively. The pooled fecal samples (n = 101 539) positive for
low pathogenic avian influenza were 4.0, 6.7 and 4.7% for biological years 2006, 2007 and 2008, respectively. The
highly pathogenic early detection system for wild birds developed and implemented in the USA represents the
largest coordinated wildlife disease surveillance system ever conducted. This effort provided evidence that wild
birds in the USA were free of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (given the expected minimum prevalence of
0.001%) at the 99.9% confidence level during the surveillance period.
Key words: disease surveillance, highly pathogenic avian influenza, H5N1, morbidity and mortality, wild bird.
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INTRODUCTION
Wild birds, specifically species in the order Anseriformes
(e.g. ducks, geese and swans) and Charadriiformes (e.g.
gulls, terns and shorebirds), are considered the natural
reservoir of all 144 subtypes of avian influenza viruses
(AIVs), which are globally distributed in these species
(Webster et al. 1992; Stallknecht & Brown 2008). Avian
influenza infections in wild birds are typically apathogenic
or subclinical in nature (Webster et al. 1992; Stallknecht et
al. 2007; van Gils 2007). Until the recent emergence of the
highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1
subtype in Asia, severe morbidity and mortality from AIV
infection in wild birds was uncommon and documented
Integrative Zoology 2009; 4: 426-439 doi: 10.1111/j.1749-4877.2009.00180.x
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on only one occasion (Becker 1966). After movement of
HPAIV H5N1 out of Southeast Asia and into Qinghai Prov-
ince in China, Mongolia, and eventually into Europe and
Africa in 2005, considerable international effort focused
on controlling HPAIV H5N1 in endemic countries and pre-
venting further spread.
Wild birds, by their very nature, are not subject to dis-
ease containment controls as are domestic birds and
people. Therefore, the ability to effectively control the
spread of the HPAIV H5N1 virus in these species depends
on the ability to rapidly detect the pathogen and available
resources to mitigate potential spread to domestic birds.
As part of the USA’s National Strategy for Pandemic
Influenza, which included both animal and human pan-
demic preparedness, an interagency strategic plan to de-
tect an introduction of HPAIV was developed (Homeland
Security Council 2005; USDA 2006). The USA recognized
that the greatest risk of introduction was from the illegal
importation of poultry and poultry products, and through
the illegal trade of wild and exotic birds. Consequently,
border protection and domestic bird surveillance programs
already in place were strengthened to meet the increased
risk of the rapidly spreading HPAIV H5N1 subtype.
The risk that wild birds could move the HPAIV H5N1
subtype into the country was also identified; wild birds
likely played a role in moving the virus into Qinghai Prov-
ince in China, Mongolia and Western Europe (Chen et al.
2006a,b; Gilbert et al. 2006; Olsen et al. 2006; Weber et al.
2007; Wang et al. 2008; Szeleczky et al. 2009). Although
studies on AIVs in wild birds have been conducted in the
USA and Canada (Olsen et al. 2006; Stallknecht et al. 2007),
these are limited in geographic scope and not designed to
provide early warning of new virus introductions. To de-
crease the risk of an undetected entry of H5N1 and other
HPAIV into the country, the USA developed an early de-
tection system for wild birds. A working group of wildlife
biologists, veterinarians, virologists and public health ex-
perts developed The USA Interagency Strategic Plan for
An Early Detection System for Highly Pathogenic H5N1
Avian Influenza in Wild Migratory Birds (USA Strategic
Plan) that provided guidelines for agencies and programs
conducting AIV surveillance in wild birds (USDA 2006).
The purpose of this plan was to describe the essential
components of a unified national system for the early de-
tection of HPAIV, specifically the H5N1 subtype, in mi-
gratory birds. Although the immediate concern was a po-
tential introduction of HPAIV H5N1 into the USA, the
system was developed to detect any HPAIV in migratory
birds regardless of the source. Additionally, the system
increases knowledge regarding low pathogenic avian in-
fluenza viruses and the general health of wild birds. This
Plan has been used to develop flyway and state-specific
implementation plans for HPAIV surveillance by estab-
lishing guidelines consisting of standardized protocols
for sampling wild birds, handling and shipping samples,
diagnostic testing, and communicating results.
The USA Strategic Plan targets all sick and dead wild
birds, as well as wild bird species in North America that
have the highest risk of being exposed to, or infected with,
the HPAIV H5N1 subtype based on known migratory
movement patterns. These include birds that migrate di-
rectly between Asia or Europe and the USA that might be
in contact with species from areas with reported outbreaks,
that are known to be reservoirs of AIV, or that occur in
high risk areas. However, should HPAIV H5N1 be detected
in domestic birds in the USA, sampling of additional wild
species would be conducted.
Sampling for HPAIV in wild birds was stratified longi-
tudinally to account for general migratory patterns across
the continent. Although intraspecific and interspecific
variability in migratory pathways are common (Hochbaum
1955; Welty & Baptista 1988; Brown et al. 2001), the tradi-
tional waterfowl flyways (i.e. Atlantic, Mississippi, Cen-
tral and Pacific) were used as a template in evaluating the
risk of HPAIV H5N1 introduction through migratory birds
on a continental scale (Lincoln 1935; Blohm 2006). The
Pacific and Central Flyways were considered the regions
through which the introduction of HPAIV H5N1 most likely
would occur by wild birds. Many migratory species that
nest in subarctic and arctic Siberia, Alaska and Canada
follow the Pacific and Central Flyways to wintering areas
in North and South America (Winker et al. 2007). The over-
lap at the northern ends of these flyways with Eurasian
flyways establishes a pathway for potential disease trans-
mission across continents and for mixing, re-assortment
and exchange of genetic material among strains from
Eurasia and North America (Jackwood & Stallknecht 2007;
Krauss et al. 2007; Koehler et al. 2008; Lebarbenchon et
al. 2009).
Although the risk of HPAIV H5N1 introduction through
migratory birds was considered higher in the Pacific and
Central Flyways, potential introduction of the virus
through the Atlantic and Mississippi Flyways was also
considered important. Some species such as the northern
pintail (Anas acuta L., 1758) and tundra swan (Cygnus
columbianus Ord, 1815) migrate across several flyways
during fall and spring (Lincoln 1935; Kear 2005; Boere &
Stroud 2006). In addition, geographic overlap of breeding
birds in the Atlantic Flyway with birds from the East At-
lantic Flyway exists (Olsen et al. 2006), although the de-
US wild bird avian influenza surveillance
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gree of interspecific and intraspecific overlap is consider-
ably less than occurs in flyways of the Pacific region
(Markova et al. 1999; Kear 2005).
Finally, although HPAIV H5N1 had not been detected
in the western hemisphere, the potential for wild birds to
move the virus north if it was introduced into Central and
South America was considered. Therefore, the USA Stra-
tegic Plan provided a national framework for HPAIV H5N1
surveillance in wild birds, which recommended that re-
gional flyway plans be developed. These flyway plans
were further refined into individual state surveillance plans,
such that all the potential routes of entry for HPAIV H5N1
through migratory birds could be monitored.
Our objective is to provide an overview of the compre-
hensive USA Strategic Plan and its implementation. Sev-
eral authors have criticized the USA HPAIV H5N1 early
detection system, suggesting that it focused exclusively
on the Asia–Alaska route of entry into the USA (Kilpatrick
et al. 2006; Peterson et al. 2007; Peterson & Williams 2008).
These authors imply that little to no wild bird surveillance
in other potential pathways of introduction (e.g. entry from
the South and transatlantic routes) was being conducted.
Here, we provide a comprehensive description of the US
interagency early detection system to clarify previous
misconceptions and to provide preliminary data on the
first 3 years of surveillance.
METHODS OF SURVEILLANCE
The USA Strategic Plan recommends five strategies for
collecting surveillance data on AIVs in wild birds. Agen-
cies and organizations are encouraged to use one or more
of these strategies when designing AIV surveys. Each
strategy has biological, logistical and economic benefits
and constraints; consequently, agencies have based imple-
mentation of the strategies on an evaluation of these fac-
tors at specific sampling locations and times of year.
Investigation of morbidity and mortality
events
Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 has been
shown to cause morbidity and mortality in a wide variety
of wild species (USGS 2008), and most detections in wild
birds have been through morbidity and mortality events
(Olsen et al. 2006; Gauthier-Clerc et al. 2007). Systematic
investigation of these events in wild birds seems to offer
the highest and earliest probability of detecting HPAIV
H5N1 if it is introduced by wild birds (Kilpatrick et al.
2006; USDA 2006).
Benefits gained from conducting disease investigations
of wildlife mortality events are not unique to AIV. Many
diseases have been identified through the wildlife disease
investigation process (Friend & Franson 1999; McLean et
al. 2002; Merianos 2007). Investigation of morbidity and
mortality events also provides management recommenda-
tions that can mitigate or reduce additional events in wild
birds. Morbidity and mortality sampling in wild birds is
important for providing early warning to domestic animals,
wildlife and human health officials. Outbreaks near do-
mestic poultry and swine operations should initiate en-
hanced surveillance activities on farms and measures to
minimize contact among wild birds, domestic animals and
humans.
The success of this strategy requires early detection
and assessment of events, rapid submission of samples
to qualified diagnostic laboratories, rapid testing, immedi-
ate reporting of diagnostic results and rapid implementa-
tion of pre-established response protocols. The US strat-
egy capitalizes on existing morbidity and mortality sur-
veillance programs by state and federal agencies; some of
these programs have been in place for decades (e.g. sur-
veillance at migratory waterfowl refuges) and others are
relatively new (e.g. West Nile virus monitoring programs).
These programs use agency personnel as well as the pub-
lic to detect and report events to trained wildlife disease
investigators. Investigations related to morbidity and
mortality events are conducted regardless of the time of
year, type of species involved, number of species involved,
or the number of samples previously collected in the state.
Assessment of these events, and collection and shipment
of samples to diagnostic laboratories are usually made
within 24 h of identifying the incident. Diagnostic testing
and reporting results are completed within an additional
72 h, allowing for rapid implementation of response
protocols.
The USA has enhanced its capabilities to respond to
morbidity and mortality events by increasing personnel
and resources dedicated to detection, investigation and
reporting of sick and dead birds. Training courses designed
to increase the number of wildlife professionals qualified
to investigate morbidity and mortality events were
conducted, educational materials were provided to
sportsmen, bird watchers and the general public to in-
crease reporting of events, and a national telephone hotline
was established to report dead birds.
Although investigation of morbidity and mortality
events in wild birds is critical for effective HPAIV H5N1
detection systems, comprehensive surveillance of these
events is problematic, even in countries with established
programs. Most morbidity and mortality events in wild
T. J. DeLiberto et al.
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birds go undetected because they involve few individuals,
occur in areas of low human density, or quickly become
unavailable for sampling due to predation, scavenging or
rapid autolysis (Bellrose 1981; Humburg et al. 1983;
Stutzenbacher et al. 1986; Baldassarre & Bolen 2006;
Klopfleisch et al. 2007). Additionally, evidence for the
evolution of HPAIV H5N1 strains that are not pathogenic
to particular species of wild birds is mounting (Sturm-
Ramirez et al. 2004; Hulse-Post et al. 2005; Kou et al. 2005;
Chen et al. 2006b). Recent experimental research
(Keawcharoen et al. 2008) demonstrates that mallards
(Anas platyrhynchos L., 1758) are resistant to developing
clinical signs from HPAIV H5N1 infection, whereas an-
other study documents that even highly susceptible
species, such as mute swans (Cygnus olor Gmelin 1789)
can be clinically protected by previous exposure to AIV
(Kalthoff et al. 2008). Consequently, surveillance systems
should also employ active (e.g. apparently healthy bird)
as well as passive (e.g. morbidity/mortality event) sam-
pling techniques (Doherr and Audigé 2001; Guberti &
Newman 2007; OIE 2008).
Surveillance in apparently healthy birds
Two strategies for sampling apparently healthy wild
birds are recommended in the USA Strategic Plan: hunter-
harvest and live-bird sampling. Similar to morbidity and
mortality event sampling, each of these strategies has
advantages and disadvantages. Successful implementa-
tion of these strategies is time and location specific.
Hunter-harvest sampling
Regulated hunting of wild migratory birds by sports-
men and subsistence harvests by Native Americans occur
throughout most of North America. The primary advan-
tage of hunter-harvest sampling is its cost-effectiveness:
most of the waterfowl species in North America are classi-
fied as game birds, existing infrastructure (e.g. check
stations) is in place in most migratory and wintering areas,
and sufficient numbers of birds are harvested by hunters,
decreasing the amount of time and resources required by
biologists and veterinarians to obtain samples.
The main disadvantages of  hunter-harvest sampling
are that not all species are harvested and hunting seasons
only occur at specific times of the year (e.g. September
through January). In addition, although sport hunting is
widely distributed throughout North America, specific ar-
eas receive little to no hunting pressure because of low
hunter density or because it is prohibited by regulation (e.
g. urban areas, preserves and private property). Finally,
reliable collection of site information (e.g. geographic in-
formation system coordinates) might not be available.
Live-bird sampling
Live-bird sampling involves capturing, sampling and
releasing wild birds. This strategy is often time and labor
intensive, requiring trained personnel, which can result in
a significant financial investment. However, if implemented
properly, live-bird sampling provides valuable data toward
a comprehensive surveillance system.
An important advantage of this strategy is that it can
be implemented at specific sites and at any time of the
year birds are present. For example, many species of
Charadriiformes are not hunted and hunting of game spe-
cies within urban areas is not possible. Virtually any spe-
cies of interest can be targeted, but the technique requires
trained biologists to operate specific trap types (e.g. mist
nets, cannon and rocket nets, and Q-traps) as well as prop-
erly handling targeted species to prevent injury and death.
Sentinel species
Waterfowl, exhibition game fowl and poultry flocks
reared on backyard premises have been used as sentinels
for active surveillance for avian diseases of interest to the
commercial poultry industry and regulatory agencies
(McBride et al. 1991; Johnson et al. 2004). Sentinel ducks
have been used effectively to determine the presence of
AIV and timing of infection associated with the arrival of
wild migratory waterfowl in wetland habitats (Turek et al.
1984; Sinnecker et al. 1982a,b; Halvorson et al. 1983;
Halvorson et al. 1985; Kelleher et al. 1985).
Major advantages of sentinel bird surveillance include
the previous success of such systems to effectively de-
tect AIV (Halvorson et al. 1983; Halvorson et al. 1985) and
the applicability in areas in which other methods cannot
be used (e.g. urban areas). Disadvantages include the ex-
pense of rearing disease-free birds, pen construction and
husbandry. Sentinel flocks are also subject to predation
and human disturbance.
Wild bird fecal sampling
Avian influenza viruses are generally transmitted by
waterfowl through the intestinal tract and viable virus can
be detected in feces (Slemons & Easterday 1977; Webster
et al. 1978). Analyses of fecal material from waterfowl habitat
can provide evidence of AIV circulating in wild bird
populations, the specific subtypes present, levels of
pathogenicity, and possible risks to poultry and suscep-
tible livestock (Widjaja et al. 2004; McLean et al. 2007;
Franklin et al. 2009). Monitoring of fecal samples gath-
ered from waterfowl habitat is a reasonably cost effective
US wild bird avian influenza surveillance
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method of surveillance compared to live bird sampling.
Fecal sampling does not require the same level of skill to
implement as live-bird sampling and can be implemented
in rural and urban habitats. However, wild bird fecal
samples must be fresh (i.e. within 24 h before desiccation
and extended exposure to sunlight), might contain envi-
ronmental contaminants that adversely impact diagnostic
analyses, and can be difficult to obtain from some species
of waterfowl that spend considerable amounts of time for-
aging and defecating in water. Exceptions are species such
as Canada geese (Branta canadensis L., 1758) and snow
geese (Chen caerulescens L., 1758) that spend significant
time foraging and defecating on land. Additionally, al-
though detection of AIVs in fecal samples is useful in
determining the presence of viruses in the environment,
the species infected might be difficult to determine if the
collector does not observe the birds defecating. In the
event of a HPAIV detection in feces, these limitations will
require subsequent sampling of the wild bird populations
in the area to allow for predictions of viral spread.
Diagnostics
Swab samples were collected from birds and wild bird
fecal samples. Bird samples were initially screened at 1 of
43 participating National Animal Health Laboratory Net-
work facilities. This network is a partnership of state and
federal laboratories across the USA that have been certi-
fied by the National Veterinary Services Laboratories
(NVSL), the US OIE (World Organization for Animal Health)
Reference Laboratory for AIV diagnostics. Swabs were
initially tested by real-time reverse transcriptase-poly-
merase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) using the matrix gene
assay (Spackman et al. 2002). The matrix gene rRT-PCR
assay was capable of detecting all 16 hemagglutinin and 9
neuraminidase subtypes. Matrix gene rRT-PCR-positive
samples were further characterized by H5-specific and H7-
T. J. DeLiberto et al.
Figure 1 Testing procedure for samples collected through the United States of America Early Detection System for Highly
Pathogenic H5N1 Avian Influenza in Wild Migratory Birds.
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specific rRT-PCR assays (Spackman & Suarez 2008). Posi-
tive H5 or H7 rRT-PCR samples were express shipped to
the NVSL within 24 h of a presumptive finding (Fig 1).
Specific rRT-PCR assays, virus isolation, subtyping and
pathogenicity tests were performed at the NVSL accord-
ing to international guidelines (OIE 2008; Swayne et al.
2008).
Wild bird fecal samples were screened by rRT-PCR at
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Wild-
life Services National Wildlife Research Center using a
modified assay based on Spackman et al. (2003). Positive
H5 and H7samples were forwarded to the NVSL for virus
isolation, subtyping and pathogenicity testing, as de-
scribed above. Additional subtyping was performed by
amplifying hemagglutinin genes and sequencing analysis
(Van Dalen et al. 2008).
USDA IMPLEMENTATION OF THE USA
STRATEGIC PLAN
The USDA and the Department of the Interior were the
lead federal agencies responsible for working with tribal
and state partners to implement the USA Strategic Plan. In
coordination with these partners, the USDA Wildlife Ser-
vices prioritized all 50 states according to known distribu-
tions of AIVs in wild birds, species-specific migratory
pathways, geographic size and location of each state,
wetland habitat and their juxtaposition with coastal
shorelines, input from waterfowl biologists and flyway
councils, and band recovery data (Fig 2). Target sample
numbers were highest for priority Level 1 states, followed
by Level 2 and 3 states, respectively.
Sampling was conducted during a biological year (BY)
US wild bird avian influenza surveillance
Figure 2 United States Department of Agriculture priority ranking system for the detection of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian
influenza in wild birds. Sampling goals were highest in Level 1 states followed by Level 2 and 3 states, respectively.
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beginning 1 April and ending 31 March. All reports of sick
or dead birds (i.e. morbidity/mortality events) were inves-
tigated regardless of species. Separate tracheal and cloa-
cal swabs were collected from each bird sampled in these
events, and placed into separate tubes to preserve the
greatest chance of isolating HPAIV and accurately de-
scribing the pathogenesis in affected birds.
During BY06 (i.e. 1 April 2006–31 March 2007), a cloa-
cal sample was collected from each apparently healthy
bird (i.e. hunter-killed, live-captured and sentinel birds)
using a sterile dacron-tipped swab (Puritan, Puritan Medi-
cal Products Company LLC, Guilford, Maine, USA) and
placed into a glass vial with 3 mL of brain–heart infusion
media (Becton Dickinson, Sparks, Maryland, USA).
Samples were stored in coolers with ice immediately after
collection, transferred to refrigerators, and usually shipped
within 24 h to one of the National Animal Health Labora-
tory Network facilities for rRT-PCR testing (Fig 1). Cloacal
samples were tested in pools of up to five swabs collected
from a single species, location and time.
During BY07 and BY08, separate cloacal and oropha-
ryngeal swabs were collected from each apparently healthy
bird (i.e. hunter-killed, live-captured and sentinel birds)
sampled, and combined into one tube with 3 mL of brain–
heart infusion media. Immediately after collection samples
were transferred to refrigerators, and usually shipped
within 24 h to screening laboratories. Pooling of samples
was not conducted during BY07 and BY08 and combined
cloacal and oropharyngeal samples from individual birds
were tested separately.
In total, 50 000 wild bird fecal samples were collected in
all 50 states during BY06. Based on a risk assessment us-
ing the BY06 data and an analysis of bird band recovery
data, the sample size was reduced to 25 000 collected from
31 states in BY07 and BY08 (Doherty & Wilson 2009).
Fecal samples were collected by inserting the swab into
fecal material deposited on the ground (USDA 2008). Swabs
were stored in individual tubes and then pooled in the
laboratory for analysis (up to five swabs per location).
Viral transport media in sample tubes was BA-1 with anti-
T. J. DeLiberto et al.
Figure 3 Locations of wild birds sampled by the United States Department of Agriculture, and state and tribal wildlife agencies from
1 April 2006 to 31 March 2009.
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biotics in BY06 and BY07 and brain–heart infusion media
without antibiotics in BY08. Immediately after collection,
samples were stored on ice packs and shipped to diag-
nostic laboratories at 4°C.
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
To demonstrate freedom of HPAIV H5N1 in the USA
wild, migratory bird population, a post hoc analysis on
the number of wild bird and fecal samples collected during
BY06-08 was conducted using FreeCalc v.2.0 (Cameron &
Baldock 1998) to test the null hypothesis that HPAIV was
present in the population at the minimum expected preva-
lence (>0.001%). Freedom of disease was calculated using
the infinite population probability formula with a = 0.01
and b = 0.01. Test sensitivity and specificity were set at
73.4 and 99.8%, respectively. Population size was set at 50
million and the infinite population threshold was set at
10 000 individuals.
Apparent prevalence of AIV in wild birds was calcu-
lated as the proportion of animals from the survey that
tested matrix gene positive by rRT-PCR at a National Ani-
mal Health Laboratory Network facility or at the National
Wildlife Research Center in the case of wild bird fecal
samples. Apparent prevalence of H5 and H7 subtypes was
calculated as the proportion of animals from the survey
that tested positive by rRT-PCR at the NVSL.
US wild bird avian influenza surveillance
Table 1 Number of real-time reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction positive H5 avian influenza detections in wild bird species
sampled by the United States Department of Agriculture, and state and tribal wildlife agencies from 1 April 2006 to 31 March 2009
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RESULTS
From 1 April 2006 through 31 March 2009, the USA
collected 367 834 wild bird and wild bird fecal samples for
AIV testing as part of the Interagency Wild Bird HPAI
Early Detection System. The USDA, with its state and
tribal cooperators, collected 314 654 (86%) of the samples
in the USA, with wild bird and fecal samples accounting
for 213 115 and 101 539 of the total, respectively. More
than 250 species of wild birds in all 50 states, Guam, Puerto
Rico and the Caribbean islands were sampled; however,
86% were collected from dabbling ducks, geese, swans
and shorebirds. The remaining 14% were collected from a
variety of other species. No wild bird or fecal sample tested
positive for HPAIV.
Of the 213 115 wild bird samples collected by the USDA,
31, 27, 21 and 21% were collected from the Atlantic, Pacific,
Central and Mississippi flyways, respectively (Fig 3). The
majority of the samples (68%) were collected using the
hunter-harvest collection strategy, followed by live wild
bird (30%), morbidity and mortality events (2%), and sen-
tinel species (<1%). The apparent prevalence of AIV in
samples collected from wild birds during BY07 and BY08
was 9.7 and 11.0%, respectively. We were unable to esti-
mate apparent prevalence in wild birds in BY06, because
matrix gene rRT-PCR testing was only conducted on
pooled samples in that year.
 There were 1760 wild bird samples that screened posi-
tive for H5 or H7 AIV by rRT-PCR at a National Animal
Health Laboratory Network facility. All states except Ha-
waii had at least 1 H5 positive sample during the 3-year
surveillance effort (Fig 4). The NVSL confirmed 1128 H5
(Table 1) and 118 H7 (Table 2) positives by rRT-PCR from
over 30 different species of wild migratory birds. All H7
positive samples were collected in BY08. Apparent preva-
lence of H5 and H7 AIV based on confirmed rRT-PCR re-
sults across all species was 0.5 and 0.06%, respectively.
Virus was isolated from 426 (25%) of the wild bird samples
that screened positive for H5 or H7. Of these, H5 subtypes
were isolated from 13 species of wild birds, and H7 sub-
types were isolated from 11 species. There were 9 different
H5 subtype combinations and 8 different H7 subtype com-
binations identified by virus isolation. Hemagglutinin
groups represented in these viruses were H1-H8, H10 and
H11; all 9 neuraminidase groups were represented in the
viruses isolated (Pedersen et al. 2009).
Of the 101 539 wild bird fecal samples collected, 27, 28,
21 and 23% were collected from the Atlantic, Pacific, Cen-
tral and Mississippi flyways, respectively. There were 4.0,
6.7 and 4.7% matrix gene positive pools for BY06, BY07
and BY08, respectively. The NVSL confirmed 0.01, 0.16
and 0.02% positive H5 fecal pools by rRT-PCR in BY06,
BY07 and BY08, respectively. No pools were confirmed
H7 positive by NVSL using rRT-PCR.
The freedom from disease analysis indicated that the
probability of observing an HPAIV positive reactor in a
sample of 367 834 from a population of 50 million wild
birds with a disease prevalence of 0.001% was P = 0.000000.
DISCUSSION
The USA Strategic Plan was successfully developed
and implemented in response to the spread of HPAIV H5N1.
This strategy capitalized on existing infrastructure and
expertise at state and federal agriculture and natural re-
sources agencies. The USA effort, combined with the Ca-
nadian and Mexican surveillance systems, represented the
largest coordinated wildlife disease surveillance program
ever implemented. During BY06–08, over 379 000 samples
were collected from wild birds throughout North America
and results were shared among all three countries. Coor-
dination of each country’s surveillance system was ac-
complished through the establishment of a trilateral HPAIV
working group in 2006. This group met periodically to re-
evaluate the continental surveillance of AIVs in wild birds,
and ensured an appropriate sampling distribution in all
four major flyways given available resources.
Results were adequate to reject the null hypothesis and
conclude that the US population of wild birds was free of
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Table 2 Number of real-time reverse transcriptase-polymerase
chain reaction real-time reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain
reaction positive H7 avian influenza detections in wild bird spe-
cies sampled by the United States Department of Agriculture,
and state and tribal wildlife agencies from 1 April 2008 to 31
March 2009
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HPAIV (given the expected minimum prevalence of 0.001%)
at the 99.9% confidence level during BY06-08. Although
no HPAIV was detected in wild birds, the system demon-
strated its capability of identifying H5 and H7 AIVs within
48 h of sampling. Additionally, preliminary sequencing of
the hemagglutinin cleavage site by NVSL of all presump-
tive H5 and H7 positive samples within 36 h of initial test
results demonstrated that the surveillance system was
capable of rapidly detecting an introduction of HPAIV
H5N1 by wild birds into the USA.
Early detection systems for potential introduction of
HPAIV H5N1 by migratory birds into North America were
supplemented with collaborative surveillance systems in
eastern Russia, Greenland and Iceland. The USDA worked
closely with the Russian Federal Centre for Animal Health
and Ministry of Natural Resources to conduct sampling
for AIV in snow geese on Wrangel Island Nature Reserve.
Most snow geese that breed on Wrangel Island migrate
through Alaska and Canada, and spend winter in the
western USA (Ely et al. 1993; Armstrong et al. 1999). In
Greenland, the USDA collaborated with the Technical Uni-
versity of Denmark, Aarhus University, the Danish Veteri-
nary and Food Administration, and the Greenland Home
Rule authorities to conduct AIV surveillance of wild birds
in the western and southern portion of the country; since
2007, over 3000 birds have been tested. Finally, the Cana-
dian Cooperative Wildlife Health Center conducted sur-
veillance for AIVs in wild birds in Iceland (CCWHC 2007).
These efforts, combined with the programs in Canada,
Mexico and the USA, provided comprehensive surveillance
of migratory birds in the North American flyways.
In addition to its capability of detecting HPAIV viruses,
the system developed by the USDA and its cooperators
provided valuable insights on AIV circulating in wild bird
reservoirs throughout the USA (Pedersen et al. 2009). Al-
though such results had been inferred from previous work,
the numerous variables (e.g. temporal and latitudinal
gradients, host immunocompetence and environmental
persistence) influencing AIV infection made it difficult to
determine which viruses were circulating within wild bird
US wild bird avian influenza surveillance
Figure 4 Locations of H5 avian influenza positive samples collected by the United States Department of Agriculture, and state and
tribal wildlife agencies from 1 April 2006 to 31 March 2009.
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populations at national and continental scales. This infor-
mation is necessary for understanding and quantifying
pathogen transmission within and among host species
(Crowl et al. 2009). Large-scale surveillance projects such
as the one undertaken in this effort will improve our un-
derstanding of the ecological parameters involved in the
maintenance and transfer of AIVs from natural reservoirs
to humans, which is an important component for develop-
ing methods to prevent future pandemics (Webster et al.
1992).
It is generally recognized that countries conducting
comprehensive disease surveillance in wildlife populations
are more likely to understand the epidemiology of specific
infectious pathogens and zoonotic disease outbreaks.
These countries are better equipped and prepared to de-
velop solutions that will protect humans, agriculture and
wildlife. Consequently, active surveillance for diseases of
animal or public health concern in wildlife, such as HPAIV,
is particularly beneficial to national and international
interests. The OIE encourages all countries to develop
and maintain wildlife disease surveillance systems that
complement and support human health and agricultural
animal disease programs.
Development and implementation of the USA Strategic
plan has provided important ancillary benefits toward im-
proved comprehensive wildlife disease surveillance. The
number of wildlife biologists trained to investigate mor-
bidity and mortality events, and to conduct active surveil-
lance programs for diseases was increased nationwide.
Diagnostic laboratories certified to conduct AIV testing
as part of the National Animal Health Laboratory Network
were increased, improving the capability of the USA to
rapidly detect introductions of HPAIV as well as other
exotic diseases. Enhanced communication protocols for
reporting test results of diseases of concern in wildlife
were developed and implemented. Critical field equipment
necessary for conducting disease surveillance in wildlife
and responding to disease outbreaks was purchased. A
national wild bird tissue archive was created by the USDA
to provide a resource for future studies on AIV and other
diseases. Finally, the benefits of improved coordination
among wildlife biologists and veterinarians, agricultural
veterinarians and laboratory diagnosticians resulting from
the HPAIV wild bird surveillance effort cannot be
underestimated. These enhancements to the wildlife dis-
ease surveillance efforts in the USA will continue to safe-
guard the health of wild and domestic animals, as well as
the public at large.
T. J. DeLiberto et al.
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